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Summary
EPA is in the process of regulating U.S.  greenhouse
gas (GHG) emissions using its powers under the
Clean Air Act. The likely next phase of this regulatory
program is performance standards under §111 of the
Act for coal plants and petroleum refineries, which the
Agency has committed to finalize by the end of 2012. 
Section 111 appears to allow use of flexible, marketbased regulatory tools. One such tool, tradable standards, appears to be a legally and politically viable
choice for the Agency, and evidence suggests they are
substantially more cost-effective than traditional performance standards.

F

or the near and foreseeable future, climate policy in
the United States is in the hands of the U.S. Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) and the states. 
EPA has committed to issuing what will be the first nationwide regulations on greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions from
existing sources, initially applying to the largest categories
of emitters: fossil-fuel steam power plants and oil refineries. The relevant part of the Clean Air Act (CAA),1 §111,
provides the Agency with the necessary authority, carves
out a specific planning and implementation function for
the states, and allows significant flexibility. Not only is this
the first instance of GHG regulation of existing stationary
sources, but key parts of §111 have been rarely used and
potentially support a variety of options for the design of
the regulation. The Agency therefore has the opportunity
(and the burden) of making a series of important choices
about the nature of its program for regulation of GHGs at
these sources.
The most fundamental of these choices is the regulatory approach the Agency will use.  Section 111 requires
the use of “performance standards.” Traditionally, this has
meant one-size-fits-all standards for each sector or “source
category” being regulated. But the statute does not require
such rigid standards, at least with respect to regulation of
existing sources, and the Agency has argued that it may
implement market-based emissions control programs
under the section—a reading with which most legal analysts appear to agree.2
One such market-based approach is cap and trade, which
has been used under several previous CAA programs and
was considered by the U.S. Congress in 2009 for GHGs. 
However, in the context of recent legislative efforts to
address GHG emissions, the cap-and-trade approach has
come to be seen by parts of the polity as growth-limiting. 
But even if EPA eschews cap and trade, it need not forgo
flexible, market-based tools entirely and resort to traditional inflexible standards. We describe an approach that
can incorporate trading and most of its associated efficiency benefits while avoiding some, and perhaps all, of the
political and practical drawbacks of cap and trade.
This alternative approach is a tradable standard.  Put
most simply, under a tradable standard, the Agency sets
Authors’ Note: This research has benefited from comments from
participants at the RFF’s Clean Air Act Greenhouse Gas Workshop,
July 18, 2011, and First Wednesday Seminar, December 7, 2011.
1.	
2.	

42 ELR 10338

42 U.S.C. §§7401-7671q, ELR Stat. CAA §§101-618.
Gregory Wannier et al., Prevailing Academic View on Compliance Flexibility Under §111 of the Clean Air Act, Discussion Paper 11-29 (Resources
for the Future 2011), available at http://www.rff.org/rff/documents/RFFDP-11-29.pdf. EPA made similar arguments in 2005 and 2008. See U.S. 
EPA, Advance Notice of Proposed Rulemaking (ANPRM): Regulating
Greenhouse Gas Emissions Under the Clean Air Act, 73 Fed. Reg. 44354,
44490 (July 30, 2008).

ENVIRONMENTAL LAW REPORTER

4-2012

Copyright © 2012 Environmental Law Institute®, Washington, DC. Reprinted with permission from ELR®, http://www.eli.org, 1-800-433-5120.

a performance standard, but allows emitters to trade so
that it is achieved on a sectorwide, rather than individual,
basis.  Tradable standards are almost certainly legal, are
both administratively and politically viable, and are relatively cost-effective—certainly more so than traditional
standards, and perhaps approaching or exceeding the costeffectiveness of cap and trade depending on how either
were to take shape. Also, tradable standards are not new,
having been used by EPA in limited fashion as early as the
1980s, most prominently to implement the phaseout of
lead in gasoline.3 But they are not a widely used or widely
understood policy option. The primary aims of this Article
are to explain this policy tool in theory and to describe the
decisions EPA would have to make to put this tool into
practice for GHG regulation.
The Agency faces at least two other key decisions in
implementing carbon regulations for existing sources. One
is that EPA must decide how much to leave to the states. 
The Agency could design a complete program for states
to implement—a model rule—or it could leave basic program design to the states.  Either way, states will play an
important role. But a model rule would provide a path of
least resistance for cash-strapped states and would likely
be widely adopted. Since we envision a tradable standard
as an interstate scheme, the implications of this delegation
decision are relevant, and we discuss them in some detail
in Part IV.
Finally, and perhaps most obviously, the Agency will
have to decide how stringent its §111 carbon regulations
should be. We do not directly address that issue here except
to highlight that stringency is related to flexibility, since
§111 requires the consideration of cost. By lowering cost,
flexibility would afford and enable greater emissions reduction than would a traditional (inflexible) standard.

I.

EPA, Carbon, and the CAA

The CAA has only recently emerged as a tool for regulating GHGs. The U.S. Supreme Court’s 2007 Massachusetts
v. EPA4 ruling clarified that the existing CAA gives the
Agency the authority to regulate GHG emissions.  Since
2009, EPA has made a formal science-based “endangerment finding” for GHGs and used its CAA authority to
begin regulation of carbon emissions from a variety of
sources. These regulations include fleet standards for new
road vehicles and preconstruction permits for new and
modified stationary sources (primarily power plants and
industrial facilities).
3.	

4.	

Albert L. Nichols, Lead in Gasoline, in Economic Analyses at EPA: Assessing Regulatory Impact 49-86 (R.D. Morgenstern ed., 1997); Richard
G. Newell & Kristian Rogers, The Market-Based Lead Phasedown, Discussion Paper 03-37 (Resources for the Future 2003).
549 U.S. 497, 528-29, 37 ELR 20075 (2007).
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In late 2010, the Agency committed to carbon regulations for the operation of both new and existing emitters
in the sectors with the largest emissions: fossil-fuel steam
power-generation (mostly coal) and petroleum refining. 
These regulations are required under the terms of a pair
of settlement agreements between EPA and states and
environmental groups that had sued the Agency seeking
GHG performance standards.5 The standards, under §111
of the Act, will be the first national carbon regulations for
existing emitters.  Under the agreement, the Agency was
to propose the standards in 2011 (though this has been
repeatedly delayed) and finalize them by the end of 2012.6

A.

Section 111 Performance Standards: New and
Existing Sources

When EPA does issue the promised standards, the process will unfold as follows.  Under §111 of the Act, EPA
is charged with setting “performance standards” that
will apply to new sources in defined “source categories.”7
Sources cannot be operated unless they meet these standards.8 The Agency currently has such new source performance standards (NSPS) for a wide variety of sources,
covering a wide variety of pollutants (though not GHGs).
But §111 also provides for the regulation of existing
sources via performance standards.9 Only specific pollutants can be subject to such existing source performance
standards (ESPS): that is, those not regulated under other
parts of the statute, such as programs for “criteria” or hazardous pollutants. In the past, almost no pollutants have
fallen into this category, so the Agency has issued only a
few ESPS. But GHGs at existing sources are not regulated
elsewhere under the Act, and are therefore subject to ESPS.
ESPS, unlike NSPS, require states to play a major regulatory role.  Under ESPS, states propose the standards,
EPA decides whether to approve them, and states implement them.  The statute explicitly analogizes the process
to the state implementation plan (SIP) process for regulating conventional “criteria” pollutants, such as nitrogen
oxides (NOx) and particulates, under a different part of
the CAA.10 The only substantive requirement §111 imposes
5.	

6.	

7.	
8.	
9.	
10.

See Settlement Agreement (boilers), State of New York et al. v. EPA, No. 
06-1332 (D.C. Cir. 2007), availabe at http://www.epa.gov/airquality/pdfs/
boilerghgsettlement.pdf; and Settlement Agreement (refineries), State of
New York et al. v. EPA, No. 06-1332 (D.C. Cir. 2007), available at http://
www.epa.gov/airquality/pdfs/refineryghgsettlement.pdf.
As of early 2012, proposals have yet to be released, but EPA remains bound
to issue them under the agreements. Failure to complete the rulemakings
would result in the states and environmental groups reopening their litigation to force the Agency to issue the standards.
See CAA §111(b).
CAA §111(e).
CAA §111(d).
Id.
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on the states is that they must regulate using performance
standards, as defined in the statute.
The statute appears to give states the initiative in the
ESPS process, but since EPA must ultimately approve or
disapprove state plans, under the Agency’s interpretation, it
must first issue guidelines to the states.11 How detailed these
guidelines will be is an important decision for the Agency. 
They could come in almost any form, from a methodology
for the states to apply in their planning process, to a simple emissions rate performance target, to a fully specified
model rule for a trading program. Analogous examples of
each approach can be found in the development of various
SIPs for regulating conventional pollutants.

The policy tool we describe, tradable standards, has
some similarities with cap and trade—most obviously, the
ability to trade credits. But tradable standards differ from
cap and trade in important ways that reduce their associated administrative complexity and political controversy. 
First, they have much more in common with traditional
performance standards that EPA has frequently used in
the past under §111, likely reducing legal risk and certainly
making states and EPA more comfortable with administering the program. They also require no emissions cap, likely
reducing political criticism.  Finally, they do not require
EPA to administer the complex and controversial process
of allocating emissions allowances.17

B.

II.

Performance Standards and Flexibility

Performance standards have traditionally meant a uniform
source-categorywide standard, based on a technological
assessment, which must be met by each source subject to
the standard.12 But both EPA and independent legal analysts have argued that the Act does not require such a rigid
approach for existing sources.
The statute defines performance standards as regulations
that reflect the “best system of emission reduction” taking
cost into consideration.13 EPA and legal analysts argue that
this allows the use of market-based, flexible compliance
mechanisms, since the Agency could identify such tools as
the “best system.”14
In principle, §111 appears to be sufficiently flexible for
EPA to implement a cap-and-trade system.  Indeed, EPA
attempted to do this in 2005 for mercury emissions from
coal plants,15 though that rule was rejected by courts for
unrelated reasons. Nevertheless, cap and trade is politically
controversial, and opponents of environmental regulation
would undoubtedly criticize an EPA decision to implement a policy recently rejected by Congress. At least one
high-ranking EPA official has explicitly promised that the
Agency will not consider cap and trade.16 Therefore, whatever the advantages of cap and trade as a policy tool may
be, we do not consider it here.
11. U.S.  EPA, Background on Establishing New Source Performance
Standards (NSPS) Under the Clean Air Act 2 (2011), available at
http://www.epa.gov/airquality/pdfs/111background.pdf.
12. As traditionally understood, a “performance standard” sets a concrete regulatory goal, but need not be achieved by use of any particular technology or
measure. Nonetheless, it is generally set at a rate of emissions that reflects the
performance of a preferred control technology identified by EPA. Hence,
the traditional standard is viewed as inflexible, because technology options
are in reality often limited, and because there is traditionally no ability to
trade among facilities.
13. CAA §111(a).
14. While this interpretation has not been tested in court and is not universally
accepted, it appears to be the prevailing view. See Wannier et al., supra note
2, at 4-5; Nathan Richardson, Playing Without Aces: Offsets and the Limits
of Flexibility Under Clean Air Act Climate Policy, Discussion Paper 1149 (Resources for the Future 2011), available at http://www.rff.org/RFF/
Documents/RFF-DP-11-49.pdf.
15. Clean Air Mercury Rule (CAMR), 70 Fed. Reg. 28606 (May 18, 2005).
16. See Gabriel Nelson, EPA Promises to Avoid Cap, but Some Utilities
Want Trade, E&E News, Feb.  4, 2011, http://www.eenews.net/public/
eenewspm/2011/02/04/2 (last visited Feb. 23, 2012).

Fundamentals of Tradable Standards

Tradable standards combine elements of traditional performance standards with markets. Just as under traditional
regulation, tradable standards require the regulator to set
a performance standard for sources in the sector being
regulated.  But instead of requiring each source to meet
the standard independently, sources that do not meet the
standard can purchase credits from those that outperform
it, such that the standard is achieved on average across the
regulated sector.

A.

Tradable Standards for the Electricity Sector

Fossil-fuel electricity generation is an especially important
example, because it has the largest emissions of any sector
to be regulated by EPA. A tradable standard in the electricity sector would work as follows. First, the Agency would
set a standard limiting the average heat rate (energy input
per unit of electricity output) or emissions rate (emissions
per unit of electricity output) of regulated electricity-generating units (EGUs) at a benchmark level achievable as an
industry average. EGUs that have a lower heat rate or lower
emissions rate would earn credits equal to the difference
between the benchmark and their actual rate that could
be traded to other facilities, or potentially banked for later
use. A unit that does not meet the performance standard
could comply either through upgrades or through the purchase of credits from other regulated EGUs.
Figure 1 illustrates trading between two facilities to
achieve compliance with an emissions rate standard, or
benchmark, set at 1,980 pounds/megawatt-hour (lbs./
MWh), which would represent a reduction of about 5%
from the average for coal steam boilers. Plant A, with an
emissions rate of 1,880, would earn a credit of 100 lbs. for
every MWh it generates. It might sell the credit to Plant B,
with an emissions rate of 2,080 lbs./MWh. Assuming the
EGUs generate the same total kilowatt hour (kWh), this
trade allows both to meet the standard. Plant B could also
17. Note that a tradable standard does not eliminate distributional issues entirely, because the regulated community may seek to secure advantage through
subcategorization (which we discuss below), or by limiting or expanding the
scope of trading.

Copyright © 2012 Environmental Law Institute®, Washington, DC. Reprinted with permission from ELR®, http://www.eli.org, 1-800-433-5120.
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make upgrades to meet the standard rather than trading,
and Plant A could make its own upgrades so as to have more
credits to sell. What decision each plant makes depends on
its upgrade costs and the market price of credits.
Figure 1. Credit Trading to Achieve
Compliance With a Performance Standard

42 ELR 10341

units are toward the left, and more heavily utilized units
are toward the top. Although many factors help explain the
diversity in the operating efficiency of units, engineering
case studies19 and statistical analysis20 suggest that opportunities for efficiency improvements are available.
There is substantial evidence that market-based
approaches in general and tradable standards in particular can help identify the least-cost opportunities for efficiency improvements and thereby reduce the costs of GHG
regulation. For example, Dallas Burtraw et al. find that a
tradable standard for fossil EGUs would result in a 60%
smaller increase in retail electricity prices and a two-thirds
reduction in overall costs compared to a traditional (inflexible) performance standard.21
Figure 2. Distribution of Heat Rates
Across U.S. Coal Fleet in 2008

Formally, under a tradable standard, credits are earned
for electricity production at the benchmark rate, and credits are surrendered at the facility’s actual rate. The units on
these credits are either British thermal unit (Btu) (in the
case of a heat-rate standard) or pounds of carbon dioxide
(CO2) (in the case of an emissions-rate standard). Hence,
one can envision a tradable standard as two instruments in
one policy. In the first, it imposes an opportunity cost on
a facility’s heat rate or emissions rate, providing a continuous incentive for improvement. In the second, it provides
an output subsidy equivalent to the value of credits earned
at the benchmark performance standard for each unit of
electricity generation.
The simplest and probably most legally defensible program design begins with EPA’s past practice of setting a
performance standard based on a technology assessment. 
In the electricity sector, EPA would establish a performance standard on the basis of a technology assessment
for each category (or subcategory) of electricity-generation
technology, e.g., coal-fired boiler, fluidized bed combustor,
oil-fired boiler, etc.18

B.

Economic and Environmental Benefits of
Tradable Standards

Once EPA has set the standard in this way, allowing trading only makes sense if it has identifiable benefits. There is
evidence that incorporating flexibility into ESPS for coalfired power plants could greatly increase the cost-effectiveness of regulation, and possibly the environmental benefits,
depending on how the cost savings are used.
The reason flexibility reduces cost is the underlying heterogeneity in the energy efficiency (heat rate) of the U.S. 
coal fleet.  This is illustrated in Figure 2, which displays
the heat rate of EGUs along the horizontal axis and the
heat input at each unit on the vertical axis. More efficient
18. In the electricity sector, a similar approach was used under Title IV of the
CAA, which allowed for an averaging of emissions rates for NOx among
commonly owned EGUs.
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Tradable standards would also provide incentives for
discovery of new improvements in energy efficiency and
reductions in GHG emissions.  In addition, the market
associated with a tradable standard would yield important
information on the costs and effectiveness of the program.22

19. Sargent & Lundy, LLC, Coal-Fired Power Plant Heat Rate Reductions, 12301-01 (2009), available at http://www.epa.gov/airmarkets/resource/docs/coalfired.pdf; Phil DiPietro & Katrina Krulla, Improving the
Efficiency of Coal-Fired Power Plants for Near-Term Greenhouse Gas Emissions Reductions, DOE/NETL-2010/1411 (2010); National Energy
Technology Laboratory (NETL), Improving the Thermal Efficiency
of Coal-Fired Power Plants in the United States (2010).
20. Joshua Linn et al., Regulating Greenhouse Gases From Coal Power Plants
Under the Clean Air Act, Discussion Paper 11-43 (Resources for the Future
2011), available at http://www.rff.org/documents/RFF-DP-11-43.pdf.
21. Dallas Burtraw et al., Retail Electricity Price Savings From Compliance
Flexibility in GHG Standards for Stationary Sources, Discussion Paper 1130 (Resources for the Future 2011), available at http://www.rff.org/RFF/
Documents/RFF-DP-11-30.pdf.
22. It is important to note, however, that the price of a credit does not translate directly to a value for the cost per ton of GHG reduction that could
be compared to the cost under other policies, such as an emissions tax for
example, or to the social cost of carbon. Interagency Working Group on Social Cost of Carbon, Technical Support Document: Social Cost of Carbon
for Regulatory Impact Analysis Under Executive Order 12866 (2010). The
credit price is influenced by the fact that credits are earned by generating
electricity (at the benchmark performance standard), which constitutes an
output subsidy that drives up the credit price.
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Because cost is an explicit consideration in setting standards under §111, the cost savings from using tradable
standards could lead to greater overall emissions reductions.  EPA has reported that it would be reasonable to
expect emissions reductions of 2-5 % for individual plants
(and up to 10% for a few plants) without major changes
in plant utilization.23 If EPA follows precedent, it would
base standards on an assessment of broad applicability and
cost under its traditional standard-setting approach.  In
that case, a reasonable expectation for the average fleetwide
heat-rate reduction based on a plant-by-plant standard
would be near the lower end of the range, at about 2%.
But under a tradable standard approach, EPA could set
a standard that reflects the heterogeneity and potential
efficiency gains across the fleet of coal-fired power plants. 
Thus, EPA could adopt a standard based on an expected
reduction in heat rate closer to 5% and justify it based on
the opportunity and incentives of a trading program to
make cost-effective improvements in the efficiency of coalfired plants.

B.

4-2012

Geographic Scope

Although tradable standards are not fundamentally complex policies, EPA and/or the states nevertheless would face
a series of important design considerations, just as with any
regulatory policy.

The cost advantage from compliance flexibility stems from
the heterogeneity of regulated sources; savings accrue by
enabling emissions-reduction activities to occur where
they are least expensive, avoiding changes that are more
expensive. In any market-based emissions control program,
trading across as broad a group of sources as possible is
desirable, because it would encompass more heterogeneity
and provide more opportunities for emissions reductions
and cost savings.
Perhaps the most obvious implication of this is that
programs that cover a larger geographic area are expected
to have a lower average cost per unit of emissions reduction and less price volatility than smaller programs.  This
means that an interstate tradable standard is preferable, and
a nationwide standard is ideal from a cost-effectiveness perspective. To the extent that interstate coordination is easier
if EPA provides more direction, the benefits of greater geographic scope point in favor of EPA taking a larger role.
Uniform national regulations would also reduce transaction costs and uncertainty across an interstate trading
program.  Such consistency provides an accurate, certain,
and consistent quantification of the performance of each
source and assures the integrity of the credits traded in the
market.  Consistency across states also makes it easier for
EPA to administer the program.

A.

C.

III. Design Choices for Tradable Standards

Setting the Standard

As noted above, there are two basic approaches in the
design of a performance standard, whether tradable or not,
for GHG emissions from EGUs. An energy-efficiency-based
performance standard would be set as heat input per unit
of electricity generated, i.e., the heat rate (Btu per kWh). 
Alternatively, an emissions-rate performance standard would
be set as CO2 emissions per unit of generation (pounds of
CO2 emissions per kWh).24
One distinction that favors a heat-rate standard is that the
identification of an efficiency target might appeal broadly
in political terms, even among those who are unconvinced
of the threat of climate change.  On the other hand, an
emissions-rate standard specifically identifies the focus of
regulatory interest: emissions.  In addition, it provides a
slightly broader set of compliance opportunities, because
electricity-generating units can achieve small reductions in
emissions by changing the type of coal they use.

23. U.S.  EPA, Technical Support Document for the Advance Notice of Proposed Rulemaking for Greenhouse Gases: Stationary Sources (2008), available at http://epa.gov/climatechange/anpr.html.
24. Efficiency (heat rate) is strongly correlated with GHG emissions—a reduction in heat rate translates to a corresponding reduction in CO2 emissions. 
As a rule of thumb, a reduction of 10 million Btu roughly equals a one-ton
reduction in CO2.

Identifying Source Categories/Subcategories

In prior implementation of regulations under §111, EPA
has traditionally established categories and/or subcategories of emissions sources that are technologically similar
with identifiable control technologies. Using this approach,
EPA would establish performance standards for the identified categories or subcategories that are consistent with
its judgment of the overall degree of emissions reduction
that could be achieved by the source category—e.g., coalfired boilers or fossil-fuel-fired electric-generating units. As
noted above, the statute requires EPA to use source categories as the basis for its §111 performance standards, but the
Agency retains discretion over whether and how to define
the boundaries of these categories.25
The strongest case for creating different categories
arises where there are significant differences in technology and performance.  Figure 3 illustrates the distribution of heat rates at various facilities, sorted by boiler
technology.  Among coal technologies, fluidized bed
combustors involve a different combustion technology
and appear to be significantly different in terms of performance.  Hence, EPA might reasonably create a category for fluidized bed combustors that is separate from
other coal-fired EGU boilers.

25. CAA §111(b). See also U.S. EPA, supra note 11, at 2-3.
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Figure 3. Distribution of Heat
Rates by Boiler Technology

marks within the trading group is expected to be more
cost-effective.

D.

There appears to be no statutory restriction prohibiting
EPA from enabling a standard that bridges multiple source
categories.26 Doing so would broaden the scope of the program just as interstate trading or banking would. The most
cost-effective program design would allow trading across
many source categories.
Another important issue, from the perspective of achieving cost-effectiveness, is the definition of the performance
standard benchmark that determines the rate at which
credits are earned in each source category or subcategory. 
Units with heat rates or emissions rates below the benchmark will emerge as winners under the program relative
to units with rates above the benchmark. Owners of units
that have relatively higher rates will have an economic
interest in creating multiple benchmarks that might be
implemented as different subcategories or different benchmarks within a category.
In general, the greater the number of benchmarks, the
closer each unit will be to its benchmark, which will limit
the total magnitude of credit transfers among units. With
a proliferation of benchmarks, EGUs earn credits at their
idiosyncratic benchmark rate rather than the average rate
for the source category. This has the effect of providing a
smaller incentive to expand output at relatively efficient
units, because they earn credits at a lower rate than if there
were a single benchmark.  Conversely, less efficient units
have a greater incentive to maintain output, because they
earn credits at a greater rate. This means that to achieve the
same level of emissions reductions with a greater number
of subcategories, a more stringent average standard would
be required.
The overall result is that the proliferation of benchmarks is likely to raise program costs, even as it reduces
the financial transfers among units. Consequently, a tradable standard with the smallest possible number of bench26. See Richardson, supra note 14, at 17-18; Wannier et al., supra note 2, at 6-7.

42 ELR 10343

Biomass Co-Firing

Biomass co-firing at conventional coal-fired boilers may
provide further opportunities beyond efficiency improvements for emissions reductions.27 The amount of biomass
that can be co-fired varies with boiler type, but can be as
much as 10% of the heat input at a plant. If one considers
the combustion of waste biomass to be roughly CO2 neutral, the substitution of biomass for coal will reduce GHG
emissions for these plants. EPA has suggested that co-firing
with biomass could replace 2-5 % of current coal use.28
However, because biomass availability and the boiler
characteristics vary by region, EPA could not adopt a traditional §111 standard requiring co-firing of biomass at each
facility, since many facilities would be unable to comply
(or unable to comply at a reasonable cost).  With trading
across the sector, a market-based program, such as a tradable standard, could consider the potential GHG emissions reductions from co-firing biomass.29 Emitters with
access to biomass fuels could use them, thereby overcomplying with the standard and generating credits that could
be used elsewhere.

E.

Banking and Bad Years

Allowing the banking of credits increases the efficiency of
an emissions trading program by allowing sources to shift
reductions to lower cost time periods, smoothing price
variations among different vintages of credits and increasing the cost-effectiveness of the program.  Banking also
encourages early reductions in emissions.
Moreover, the utility sector could be vulnerable to a bad
year created by a combination of events—a hot summer,
a Hurricane Katrina-like storm, the outage of a nuclear
plant—that might require a greater utilization of the
coal-fired capacity in the fleet than anticipated in EPA’s
development of the standard. Less-efficient units are typically less-utilized and may see a relatively greater increase
in utilization in such a year, which would put strains on
the GHG regulatory program and on the electric utility
sector.30 A banking program could address this potential
problem by providing a “safety valve” to address such contingencies.  Banking allows EGUs to set aside credits for
27. Depending, of course, on one’s views about the life-cycle emissions of the
biomass fuel being used. However, co-firing of biomass is likely to involve
waste biomass almost exclusively, with little or no use of closed-loop dedicated biomass fuel supply, avoiding most of the issues associated with lifecycle biomass emissions.
28. U.S. EPA, supra note 23.
29. Richardson, supra note 14, 31-34, suggests that treating emissions from
biomass co-firing differently from coal emissions is probably, but not necessarily, legally compatible with CAA §111.
30. One observation about this scenario is that relatively higher heat rates or
emissions rates are explained in part by lower utilization.  Hence, other
things being equal, the increased utilization of units will improve their operating performance. However, this is not likely to be sufficient to address
the industry concern.

Copyright © 2012 Environmental Law Institute®, Washington, DC. Reprinted with permission from ELR®, http://www.eli.org, 1-800-433-5120.
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use to address unusual or unanticipated situations, such as
extreme weather events or the loss of significant generation
capacity due to the shutdown of other facilities.

F.

Continuing Improvement

While a tradable standard provides EGUs with an incentive
to adopt cost-effective measures to meet the standard, a set
standard provides a weak incentive for ongoing improvements in industrywide heat rate or reductions in emissions
rate.  The standard could be tightened in the future, but
since it is unclear when or whether this will happen, it is a
source of uncertainty.
An explicit commitment to specified, evolving future
targets would mitigate these issues.  To be sure, such a
phased standard could be changed just as easily as a static
one, but this is probably less likely.  A phased program
could start earlier in order to capture the low cost opportunities and as a way to provide rewards for early action. 
In fact, elsewhere under the CAA, EPA has interpreted
phased implementation to allow voluntary early adoption
of measures more stringent than currently required to
qualify for delayed compliance with subsequently required
measures.31 More directly, by coupling phased reduction
targets for future years coupled with the opportunity for
credit banking, EGUs would likely pursue a glide path
of reductions that would improve the cost-effectiveness of
the program.
Moreover, a phased program could drive further
improvements in the energy efficiency of EGUs. EPA has
interpreted §111 as allowing phased standards. In setting
standards, EPA may “look toward what may fairly be projected for the regulated future, rather than the state-of-theart present.”32
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will play an important role in implementing and perhaps
designing ESPS regulations, whether they have their own
existing programs or not. For these reasons, EPA decisions
about states’ role in the regulatory program will be critical.

A.

Top-Down or Bottom-Up?

Whatever policy tool EPA chooses for its GHG performance standards, it will not be working on a blank slate. 
Many states have existing or planned GHG regulatory
programs, and California and the northeastern states in
the Regional Greenhouse Gas Initiative have cap-andtrade programs in place. Moreover, as noted above, states

EPA’s typical practice in setting up a trading program has
been to issue a detailed model rule for adoption in SIPs.33
In addition, EPA has provided the resources to administer the market for those states adopting the model rule. 
This approach reduces the burden on the states in developing a plan and obtaining EPA approval, and providing
the resources necessary to administer a trading market.34
The adoption of a model rule further assures state-by-state
consistency in trading requirements, reducing transaction
costs and uncertainty across an interstate trading program
and providing a consistent quantification of the performance of each source. This consistency assures the integrity of the allowances traded in the market and makes it
easier for EPA to administer the program.
In past model rules involving cap and trade, EPA has
provided states with the flexibility to adopt their own
approaches to the allocation of allowances, a process that
we have noted would not be required under a tradable
standard.  However, the assignment of economic value
associated with all sorts of environmental permitting has
traditionally been state prerogative, and it might be left up
to states to determine performance standard benchmarks
for subcategories within their state to address specific distributional issues or other goals.  If states are allowed to
adopt their own benchmarks, EPA might be justified in
requiring those states to demonstrate that equivalent or
greater emissions reductions would be achieved relative to
the model rule benchmarks (ignoring interstate trading).
As we also have noted, adding subcategories and corresponding benchmarks could reduce aggregate costeffectiveness.  Requiring a demonstration of equivalency
would help remedy the concern that one state could take
an action that imposed greater emissions reductions and
raised costs for another state. It would raise costs overall,
but the additional costs would largely be imposed within
the state choosing to deviate from EPA’s benchmarks.35

31. These provisions were part of the implementation of the NOx program under Title IV. See 40 C.F.R. §76.8 (2012).
32. U.S. EPA, supra note 2, at 28620. In its CAMR, for example, EPA adopted
emissions caps in 2010 based on specified technologies, and a significantly
more stringent emissions cap in 2018 based on other control technologies
that were adequately demonstrated, but were not considered to be available for commercial application by the earlier 2010 date. In legal terms, the
Agency interpreted the “best system of emission reduction” to mean not
only a trading system, but one with increased stringency over time, based
on technology and costs.  EPA’s position has support in the relevant case
law. See Portland Cement v. Ruckelshaus, 486 F.2d 375, 391, 3 ELR 20642
(D.C. Cir. 1973) (holding that “Section 111 looks toward what may fairly
be projected for the regulated future, rather than the state of the art at present”; though note that this holding is in reference only to the new source
provisions of §111). See also Lignite Energy Council v. EPA, 198 F.3d 930,
932, 30 ELR 20279 (D.C. Cir. 1999) (holding that “EPA’s choice[s under
§111] will be sustained unless the environmental or economic costs of using
the technology are exorbitant”).

33. See U.S. EPA, supra note 11, at 2.
34. States may adopt the model rule—a fully approvable control strategy satisfying all the requirements of the §111 SIP process—either by incorporating
the model rule by reference or directly codifying the provisions of the model
rule in its SIP.
35. In addition, of course, states may adopt their own program outside of EPA’s
model rule.  However, states choosing to do so must develop an SIP and
obtain EPA approval of the SIP by demonstrating that it is equivalent in
achieving the environmental goals of the EPA model program. Under current EPA regulations, states are required to include emissions standards in
their plans—that is, standards based on an allowance system that caps emissions or that prescribes allowable rates of emissions. See 40 C.F.R. §60.24.

IV.

Interaction With the States
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States With Their Own GHG Programs

States with existing GHG regulatory programs will
undoubtedly seek to establish “equivalency” with whatever
form of §111 performance standards EPA issues, so that the
measures that in-state sources take to comply with the state
programs also count toward federal compliance. EPA must
decide, based on the statute, what equivalency means.
One option is to require the state to show that within
its program the sources covered by EPA’s standard will
achieve equal or greater performance.36 Where state programs include a variety of different sources, or allow interstate trading, it may be difficult to make this showing. EPA
would have to interpret the program in terms of emissions
reductions, rather than a more narrow emissions-rate average for this to be viable.
Another way for EPA to accommodate a variety of
state-level programs would be to allow the conversion of a
rate-based (efficiency) standard to a mass-based (emissions)
measure, and to provide guidance for how that conversion
should be conducted. As noted above, this approach could
enable states to claim credit for emissions reductions from
a variety of alternative programs, including efficiency programs or regional cap and trade.
If a nationwide EPA trading program were superimposed on existing state regulations that are more stringent
than EPA’s national program, this could pose a problem
for the state program.  In this case, emitters that comply
with the state program will overcomply with the national
program. If these emitters then use their overcompliance
to generate credits to be traded into the national program,
the net result of the state program will simply be to export
its emissions, leaving national emissions unaffected, and
likely impose upon itself higher local costs.37
However, states could probably avoid this problem relatively easily. Most obviously, a state with its own trading
system could opt out of the national trading market. This
would likely raise costs for other states by denying them
credits from the proactive state, assuming that state is also
a potential provider of low-cost allowances.38

36. Interpreted as increase in efficiency (if EPA establishes a heat-rate standard)
or reduction in the rate of GHG emissions (if EPA’s program is denominated in GHG emissions per kWh).
37. Lawrence H. Goulder & Robert N. Stavins, Challenges From State-Federal
Interactions in U.S. Climate Change Policy, 101 Am.  Econ.  Rev. 253-57
(2011).
38. We note that it is common practice of states to provide incentives (and
disincentives) through taxes and tax relief, training programs, etc., to attract
or discourage economic activity within their states. William Shobe & Dallas Burtraw, Rethinking Environmental Federalism in a Warming World,
Discussion Paper 12-04 (Resources for the Future 2012), available at http://
www.rff.org/RFF/Documents/RFF-DP-12-04.pdf.
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Conclusion

EPA faces a series of choices as it decides on its approach
for regulating stationary-source GHG emissions.  It must
decide whether to incorporate flexibility, what role to leave
to states, and how stringently to regulate—in addition to
myriad technical and procedural issues.
Adopting a tradable standard, in a phased fashion and
through a model rule, could balance competing interests
and create a comprehensive, cost-effective regulatory program (given that the Agency has eschewed cap and trade). 
Tradable standards are fundamentally flexible, and evidence
suggests that they would lead to very large cost savings over
inflexible, traditional standards.  Politically, tradable standards cannot be characterized as a cap-and-trade approach,
because they do not establish a cap. The important role for
states may also shield EPA from some political criticism.
Tradable standards do come with some risks. Litigation
over any approach is assured, and there is some possibility a
court would reject tradable standards as incompatible with
the CAA, though this appears unlikely.  Tradable standards are fundamentally transparent and simple. However,
adaptations to address environmental or distributional
objectives run the risk of introducing complexity into the
program design that could erode some of the virtues of a
market-based approach.  Balancing these considerations
will be an important element of EPA’s decisions.
Other EPA decisions on related issues also will be
important, but good options are available.  A phased
approach reduces uncertainty for industry while enshrining improved environmental performance in the program
from the start. Allowing banking of credits mitigates problems arising from unforeseen events.  And a model rule
reduces the burden on state regulators, making an interstate trading program more viable, while leaving states the
freedom to take a different course if needed.
In sum, tradable standards have been successful in
the past, are broadly consistent with both the statute and
Agency practices, and appear to be much more cost-effective than traditional performance standards. These advantages make them a compelling option for the Agency.

